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been particularly apparent in the proliferation of independent parliamentary candidates in the single member district tier of Russia's mixed electoral system. (Half the seats are elected by proportional representation [PR] , and half by plurality in single member districts.) More than half winning seats from single member districts officially ran as independents in 1993, and 34 percent of winning candidates did not affiliate with a party in 1995. 6 This examination of Russian partisan activity is based on the 1993 and 1995 elections to the State Duma in 179 single member districts in fifty-seven Russian regions (oblast and krai).7 As a more demanding environment for party building, this half of Russia's parliamentary electoral system presents a more accurate assessment of the penetration of parties into Russian society. The PR contest automatically places every registered party on the ballot in every region of the country regardless of whether a party has a regional organization or not. Relatively successful parties can thus emerge quickly under PR by developing a national following around a single charismatic individual, as witnessed in the success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in the PR tier, particularly in 1993. 8 In single member districts some measure of local organization is required for parties to field a local candidate. Races in single member districts tend to be more parochial, contested by local elites on local issues and less influenced by the coattails of the national leaders heading PR lists, as shown by the LDPR's equally surprising failure in this tier of the election.9 In the single member districts parties are forced to adapt themselves to local conditions, recruit local elites, or try to establish name recognition and support for less well known local party activists.
The complexities of party affiliation in Russia should be noted. In Russia's single member districts it is difficult to distinguish partisan and independent candidates. Not all candidates who belonged to political parties officially registered as members, especially in 1993.10 Some partisan candidates who could independently gather the signatures necessary to appear on the ballot were officially designated as independents (nominated by "voter groups") even though they conducted their campaigns as members of a party and joined party parliamentary factions in the State Duma if elected. Some candidates intentionally hid their ties to a party in fear that their party affiliation would alienate potential supporters.1 Members of minor parties that did not make it onto the PR ballot were often nominated as independents but ran as partisans. Thus, relying solely on the official designation of candidates' party affiliation provided in candidate lists tends to overestimate the number of independent candidates. 12 To compensate for this overestimation of independent candidates several additional sources were used to identify partisan candidates officially nominated as independents. In the 1993 elections Russia's Choice published a fuller list of candidates it supported in the single member districts, including some who were officially nominated as independents. 13 Candidates on PR lists and in single member districts were compared to find officially independent candidates who were on a party's PR list.14 Finally, fuller personal biographies, including more accurate information on partisan affiliation, was available for winning candidates.15 Therefore, a more expansive definition of elite partisanship was used in the study. Candidates officially designated as independents were considered partisan if they were supported by a party, also appeared on a PR party list, or won and had a partisan attachment listed in the longer candidate biographies found in the directory of deputies to the State Duma.
Elite partisanship is treated as an intervening variable in Russian politics that is affected by social and political developments and in turn influences mass and elite political behavior. Urbanization is used as the environmental variable influencing elite partisanship. Elite partisan affiliation is expected to rise with urbanization. Following the literature on western party development, I hypothesize that Russian political parties begin as urban phenomena and then gradually penetrate more peripheral rural communities. Thus, during initial elections partisan candidates will cluster in urban districts. Occupational status is the personal variable affecting elite partisanship. It is hypothesized that party formation is driven principally by those removed from state power. Candidates from state structures are assumed already to possess mobilizational resources (name recognition, organization); they therefore are expected to have little need for parties and tend to resist partisan affiliations. As an independent variable, elite partisanship is expected to have a positive effect on voter turnout. Partisan candidates are expected to present voters with more discernible policy alternatives and thus spark greater interest.
The Origins of Political Parties and Their Nationalization
Why do politicians seeking election join together in political parties? Why and how do political parties spread to dominate the nomination process in established democracies? Scholars studying these phenomena have tended to focus on the collective goods provided by parties to candidates to explain party origins and environmental factors, particularly urbanization, when examining party nationalization.
Scholars studying American political parties have argued that politicians create parties to serve their goals, primarily election to office. Parties are endogenous institutions that emerge as instruments to overcome collective action problems.'6 They are useful (indeed necessary in most cases) for office seekers because they provide certain resources. In the legislature the need to produce minimal winning majorities to realize policy goals produces incentives to form parties-in-government. While majority coalitions can form around individual issues without parties, a consistent voting equilibrium is unlikely. Parties produce a "structure-induced equilibrium" that allows partisan members to form long-term coalitions that reduce uncertainty and allow individual legislators to achieve their objectives more often." As long as the costs of joining a political party are lower than these benefits, party affiliation is a rational choice for individual legislators.'s In elections ambitious politicians are also likely to form parties to further their interests. Especially the minority out of power forms parties to achieve majority status through electoral success. Parties provide resources to overcome collective action problems for voters and candidates as well. They help voters become sufficiently informed to choose between competing candidates by providing a great deal of information inexpensively. Party labels convey a lot about a candidate's general ideological profile and major policy positions. Once established among a sizable voting constituency, the "brand name effect" of party labels can be a valuable resource for candidates by providing instant credibility and reputation.19 Winning a major party's nomination alone ensures the votes of the party's committed supporters. Moreover, parties provide economies of scale for individual candidates in mobilizing voter turnout. Whether a campaign is conducted by the party organization or individual candidates, getting out the vote for one candidate of a party often helps its other candidates as well, especially when elections to more than one office take place simultaneously. Once at the polls, voters are likely to vote on all offices up for election whether they have an interest in them or not, with partisan voters likely to cast a straight ticket for candidates of their preferred party.20
It follows from this rational choice, new institutionalist approach that politicians join political parties when they serve the ends of winning office and enacting policy in the legislature. As Aldrich argues, "politicians turn to their political party-that is, use its powers, resources, and institutional forms-when they believe doing so increases their prospects for winning desired outcomes, and they turn from it if it does not. 21 While not guaranteeing the existence of political parties, this theory sees a strong tendency toward party formation as long as competitive elections are the main avenue to political power and policy is determined by majority coalitions in elected legislatures. Of course, conditions can prevent parties from forming. Another institution may provide the resources of parties, or transaction costs of party formation may be so high as to make party formation irrational for individual candidates. Candidates may have preferences, such as strong ideological or policy preferences, that counter or outweigh winning elections and make it difficult to join a particular political party. But the ability of parties to overcome the collective action problems faced by ambitious politicians makes party formation possible if not probable.
The most prominent environmental factor affecting party building is urbanization. As Samuel Huntington has noted: "Political parties are modern organizations; they are the creation of new men in urban environments. The party leaders are usually drawn from the Western-educated intelligentsia with upper-and middle-class backgrounds. 22 Stein Rokkan, in his study of the expansion of partisan activity in Norway, provided empirical evidence of a significant difference in partisan activity in urban and rural localities. Rural areas were slower to adopt a PR party-list elec-toral system and lagged behind urban areas in the penetration of national parties into local contests. 23 Tarrow found that the rural French population was as active, if not more active, than its counterpart in the cities. However, rural French voters and politicians neglected partisan labels and were even hostile toward national political parties. This combination of high political participation and antipartisan identification challenges other comparative studies that found a positive correlation between partisan identification and political participation. 24 Tarrow attributed this rural antipartisanship to the uneven extension of suffrage to rural areas, the egalitarian social structure of rural areas which worked against identification along functional (class) cleavages, and the personal character of rural politics which ran counter to the confrontational nature of party politics. 25 In early American party development interparty competitiveness varied substantially among states depending on their level of socioeconomic development and cultural differentiation. During the period of two party competition between Federalists and Republicans (1795-1820) the New England and Mid Atlantic states tended to have far more two party competition than the rural South, which was solidly Republican. Social differentiation, based both on economic competition and ethnic diversity, was the major stimulant for party development.26 Over time the existence or absence of interparty competition continued to be related to the level of social differentiation and development.27
Urbanization and Patterns of Russian Party Activity
The Russian Federation provides an excellent test case to see if similar environmental factors have influenced the distribution of partisan activity during its initial period of party formation. Can incipient interparty competition be found at greater levels in urban areas than in rural regions?
Elite partisan activity is measured in three ways: the percent of candidates running under partisan labels, the percent of winning candidates with a partisan affiliation, and the percent of polarized districts (districts with at least one candidate from a reformist and antireformist electoral bloc).28 Table 1 shows the aggregate level of partisan activity and success by the size of the largest city in the electoral district for the 1993 and 1995 elections. Two patterns stand out. First, partisanship among candidates has increased from 1993 and 1995 in all categories (percentage of candidates, winners, and polarized districts). In particular, the significant increase in the percentage of polarized districts from 1993 to 1995 shows that, as the party system expanded with the proliferation of parties in 1995, voters were presented with a choice between candidates from reformist and antireformist parties in nearly every district. However, these data provide little support for the hypothesis that parties and The two measures of partisanship, percentage of partisan candidates and percentage of partisan winners, provide some contradictory patterns. The most rural districts (with population centers under 100,000) had a relatively high level of partisan activity but not necessarily partisan success, while the middle levels of urbanization showed a random pattern of partisan activity. In 1993 districts with cities of 101,000-250,000 had lower levels of party activity but a greater proportion of partisan winners. The next level, districts with cities of 251,000-500,000, showed the opposite tendency, greater party activity but fewer winners belonging to a party. In districts with cities of 501,000 to 2,000,000, party activity dropped to its lowest level, but party candidates' success was relatively high. Not surprisingly, the political centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg tended to have higher levels of partisan activity and success.
In The type of candidates is another factor that may help explain lower rates of partisanship. The strongest local candidates, for example, well-known members of local power structures such as oblast, city, and rayon administrations, tended to run in districts of the political center.29 As will be shown below, this group of local and regional elites tended to have a higher proportion of independents than other groups. Consequently, the lower number of partisan winners in large cities may be due to the stiff competition they faced from powerful local notables running as independents.
In 1993 significantly more members of the regional executive branch (18.6 percent) won in urban districts with cities over 100,000 than in rural districts (13.1 percent). Districts with large cities (501,000 to 2,000,000) had one of the highest percentages of winning candidates (19.2 percent) from the regional or local executive branch. Small city districts (101,000 to 250,000) had a slightly higher percentage of regional executive elites (21.9 percent), which may help account for the relatively low partisan activity in this type of district. In districts with medium cities, which had relatively high partisan activity, only 14.6 percent of winners came out of the regional executive branch.30
In 1995 the proportion of winners from regional and local executive branches was much smaller due to the influence of incumbents from 1993, but the pattern among different types of districts remained the same.31 Rural districts tended to have lower percentages of deputies from regional executive branches (2.6 percent), while urban districts had more (6.1 percent). Once again, districts with small cities (101,000 to 250,000) and large cities (501,000 to 2,000,000) had the highest percentage of winners from the regional executive elite, 8.0 and 7.5 percent, respectively. Districts with medium cities elected regional executives at a rate similar to rural districts (2.9 percent).
Occupational Status and Partisanship of Russian Elites
The personal characteristics of candidates can also affect their decisions to adopt party labels. In environments where parties do not fully control the nomination process, the social status of candidates, their name recognition, and their ability to mobilize resources may be crucial factors in determining whether candidates run under a party label or as independents. Studies show that party formation is usually driven by those outside of political and economic power structures. Politicians out of power are disadvantaged in terms of name recognition, resources, and control over state resources for patronage. To compensate, they are more likely to form cohesive, organizationally sound parties than politicians already in power.32 Studies of early party formation in the late Soviet era suggest a similar pattern.33
According to this logic, one would expect those in or close to power to shun party labels and run as independents and partisan candidates to be further removed from state power. Moreover, one would expect to find variance among parties and electoral blocs. Naturally, the parties arising out of state structures, the "parties of power," Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia, would be expected to have more candidates coming from state structures. Table 2 shows the occupational status of victorious independent and partisan candidates in oblasts and krais for 1993 and 1995. Several important patterns emerge. However, a closer examination of different types of elites from the state sector shows a great difference in the propensity of elites from different levels and branches of government to adopt partisan labels. National elites were more likely to be partisan than local elites, particularly in 1995 when a large group of incumbents from the State Duma defended their seats. This finding suggests a certain penetration of party organizations in national state, particularly legislative, structures, not only in the State Duma but also in the Congress of People's Deputies before it. Regional elites have been less apt to be coopted by political parties, which tend to be Moscowcentric in their composition. 34 There was also a significant difference between elites from regional and local executive branches and from regional and local legislatures. Candidates coming out of oblast and local executive administrations tended to shun party labels at a much higher level than candidates from the legislative branch. In both 1993 and 1995 regional executive elites made up a much greater proportion of independents than partisan winners, while regional legislators made up equal proportions of independents and partisans in 1993 and a higher share of partisans than independents in 1995. This difference may be due to the fact that regional executive elites were further removed from the electorate than the popularly elected local legislatures. Before 1996 most oblast heads of administration were appointed by President Yeltsin; they then appointed regional and local administrations. There was no popular participation in the selection process. Now that President Yeltsin has allowed the popular election of regional and local executives, a process of party formation may take place within this class of regional elites. Challengers in gubernatorial elections who lack electoral resources may turn to parties (of either national or regional orientation) to gain election at the local level, which may force incumbents less in need of party organizations to do the same. This increased partisanship may then extend to the national level as the political careers of these elites progress. 35 Other categories of candidates (economic elites and intelligentsia) had similar shares of independent and partisan deputies in 1993. 36 In 1995 there was a dramatic shift away from these types of candidates toward the state sector due to incumbency, especially among partisan candidates. Thus, by the second election independents were drawing a much greater share of their successful candidates from the economic elite than parties because these candidates were the other class of citizens that might already possess the resources (particularly money) that parties provide. The shift away from the intelligentsia seems to have followed an opposite trend. The number of doctors, lawyers, academics, and other members of the intelligentsia among independent and partisan winners declined sharply from 1993 to 1995, but this type of candidate is finding success much more as a partisan than as an independent, probably due to the lack of electoral resources that flow from this stratum of the population. Members of the intelligentsia are truly outsiders who need parties to gain political power. As will be seen, this type of candidate has found the greatest success as part of the Communist Party, which boasts the closest thing to party identification among a solid constituency in Russian politics. Table 3 shows the occupational status of winning candidates for selected parties in 1993 and 1995.37 Parties varied dramatically in the proportion of their winning candidates from the political elite, economic elite, and intelligentsia. As parties explicitly built around the state apparatus, Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia had the highest proportions of winners from state structures both nationally and regionally. In Russia's Choice 56.1 percent of winners came from national and regional state structures, compared to 39.4 percent for all deputies. Similarly, in 1995 Our Home Is Russia had a larger share of winners who had positions in the state (85.7 percent) than the average (60.4 percent). These parties also managed to do the best job in coopting regional executive elites which have been the most resistant to partisan affiliation. Russia's Choice matched independents in the proportion of regional executives winning seats, while Our Home Is Russia had a greater proportion of winners from this governmental stratum than independents. However, neither of the government parties was able to turn this success in recruiting regional political elites into a decisive number of single member district seats.38 In particular, the failure of Our Home Is Russia to capitalize on its monopoly of regional political elites shows the limits of electoral strategy based primarily on personalities over policy.
Despite the existence of self-proclaimed government parties in 1993 and 1995, opposition parties from both sides of the spectrum could not be described as comprising only "outsider" groups removed from political power. All political parties that found a reasonable amount of success in the single member districts had a significant contingent of winners coming from national and regional government. The Agrarian Party, in particular, managed to attract a significant contingent from national and regional state structures to complement its dominance within state-run agriculture. Moreover, contrary to the Yabloko bloc's self-constructed image as a group of new politicians outside the establishment, a large proportion of its successful candidates came from local and national power structures, particularly regional and local legislatures.
The Communist Party was the most successful party of "outsiders." Although only recently divorced from power, the Communist Party did not have many wellknown local notables running under its banner. Rather, the KPRF won seats based on local organization and a well-established constituency loyal to its ideological opposition to market reforms, as seen in the high proportion of Communist Party winners from the intelligentsia, which has the fewest independent sources of electoral capital, particularly in 1993 but also in the party's resurgence in 1995. The other party with a majority of candidates removed from state power was Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party. However, this party's poor showing in the single member districts shows the varying degrees to which a party can help its candidates win, depending on whether or not it has strong ties to a well-defined social constituency. Unlike the Communists, who can rely on the pensioner vote, the LDPR is a charismatic party with a much less well defined social constituency dedicated more to the leader than to his party or platform. While this personalized following has allowed the LDPR to perform well in the PR election, Zhirinovsky's coattails did not extend to the single member district races, which were more concentrated on the personal characteristics of the local candidates. If these hypotheses hold in Russia, one would expect a positive correlation between the presence of political parties and voter turnout. To test this hypothesis, ordinary least-squares multiple regression was used to examine the influence of the level of partisanship (percentage of partisan candidates per district), party polarization (existence of at least one candidate from a reformist and an antireformist political party), and urbanization (size of largest city in district aggregated into the five categories defined above) on voter turnout.43 Urbanization was used as a control variable because it has been found to be the decisive environmental factor influencing voter turnout, consistently having an inverse relationship with turnout; that is, contrary to most comparative experience Russian voter participation runs higher in rural districts than in urban districts.44 Table 4 shows the results of multiple regression for both 1993 and 1995.
The findings from this analysis suggest that parties played a role in bolstering voter turnout in both 1993 and 1995, albeit in different ways. In 1993 the degree of partisanship (percentage of candidates per district) was not significantly related to voter turnout after controlling for urbanization. However, party polarization had a Party affiliation among Russian elites is a function more of individual characteristics than of environmental factors. Contrary to the comparative literature, elite partisanship was not positively related to urbanization. The existence of a strong rural party and a number of urban-based reformist parties made for a rather even distribution of partisan candidates between the most rural and most urban districts and left gaps of partisan competition in districts with mid-sized cities and towns. Elite partisanship seems to depend most on whether candidates possess their own independent source of electoral capital: name recognition and organizational and financial support. Because of the combination of personalized single member district plurality elections and the predominance of patron-client relations, these resources were most likely to emanate from state power, particularly regional executive branches. Indeed, these local executives were even better poised than political elites to contest elections in single member districts because they did not have the baggage of being part of the Moscow establishment. Since they already possessed the public goods provided by a party, the costs of party affiliation outweighed the benefits, and a large contingent of competitive independent candidates emerged.
Kitschelt has argued that programmatic parties are unlikely to emerge in Russia.45 Parties will not be inconsequential, but a different type of more clientelistic or charismatic party will emerge. Over the long term, whether these parties will dominate electoral politics or will continue to compete with a large contingent of well-known regional political elites running as independents depends more on rules and elite actions and decisions than on deep social structures and cleavages.
Rules governing electoral competition have a profound effect on the status of political parties. The introduction of a partisan ballot for single member district elections has greatly increased the ability of parties with substantive social constituencies, primarily the Communist Party, to win seats based on party identification rather than simply the personal characteristics of their candidates. This ballot should encourage elites to join parties because they can now offer tangible reputational benefits. Particularly encouraged should be elites removed from state power who have few other avenues to challenge entrenched regional establishments. Moreover, the direct election of regional and local executives should introduce party competition to this level of government and gradually erode the nonpartisanship of regional executive elites.
Finally, rules governing parliamentary factions (Russia's nascent party-in-government) have produced contradictory incentives for party development. On the one hand, the ease with which deputies running as independents can form their own parliamentary factions with equal status of party-based factions removes incentives to join parties in the electoral arena because elites are allowed to reap the benefits of being members of a party-in-government without being a member of a party-in-theelectorate. Such arrangements may produce an equilibrium that allows incumbents to run continually as independents and simply form parliamentary factions after elections to enhance their influence over policymaking and achieve desired legislative outcomes. On the other hand, by forcing nonpartisan deputies to join parliamentary factions if they want a voice in policymaking, these rules may gradually initiate a process of party formation among independents in the legislature that may later be extended to the electoral realm following Duverger's model of internally created parties. 46 
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